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Elsewhere, I argue for more enfranchisement, through lowering 
the voting age & through inclusive capacity testing regimes.
Both approaches are designed to minimise the number of 
capable voters excluded through age limits.
One common concern (once the desirability of more 
enfranchisement is acknowledged) is that the logic of my 
argument suggests that we ought just to enfranchisement 
everybody.
(2)
I have in the past deferred this discussion on 
ground of practicality - convincing actual 
democracies to lower the voting age at all is 
hard enough - convincing them to let 
incompetent infants vote will be much, much 
harder.
No more.
• We should enfranchise all capable voters.
• Many currently disenfranchised voters are in 
fact capable.
• To remedy this we ought to lower the voting 
age to the point that we are confident we are 
not excluding any capable voters.
• Doing so will include some incapable voters.
• But this isn't a problem
The bar for capability is very low. If someone is 
incapable by current standards, they vote 
randomly when/if they vote at all.
If there are enough of them, their votes will 
distribute evenly across all the options,  thus 
having no effect on the outcome.
Aside
• The best argument against letting infants vote, 
doesn’t care about infants at all. Instead, it 
attacks on two fronts: 
– A criticism of standard definitions of capacity wrt
voting.
– A rejection of the inclusive presumption.
The Inclusive Presumption
• Do we want our democracies to be inclusive or 
exclusive?
– Extant Democracies chose inclusivity.
– With the exception of Jason Brennan, Democratic 
theorists largely agree that inclusivity is the way to go. 
• Hence, the inclusive presumption.
– This suggests that we should only disenfranchise 
those whose inclusion will undermine democratic 
values.
– So the default is inclusion.
Challenging the Inclusive Presumption
• Jason Brennan argues that the competent are 
having their rights to political participation 
unduly infringed by the inclusion of incompetent 
voters
• The competence principle (2011)
– “It is unjust to deprive citizens of life, liberty or 
property, or to alter their life prospects significantly, 
by force and threats of force as a result of decisions 
made by an incompetent or morally unreasonable 
deliberative body, or as a result of decisions made in 
an incompetent and morally unreasonable way.” (704)
• Yet competence requirements are widespread in liberal 
democracies.
• The standards are exceedingly low, and it is simply false 
that (as Brennan claims) ‘many’ would fail to pass 
them.
• One must understand the nature and significance of 
voting and have the ability to make a choice between 
options.
• So, Brennan is committed to the following practical 
claim:
• The competence required of a voter in a modern liberal 
democratic state is higher than is currently recognised, 
even by those states which have articulated a 
competence requirement.
• Brennan neither defends this nor sets out the standard 
he takes to be required for competence.
• The complaint must then be that current competence 
standards are so low as to be trivial to satisfy, and that 
the satisfaction of these trivial standards is insufficient 
to protect the Life, Liberty and Property of the *truly* 
competent.
Against Brennan
• “Violating the competence principle means putting 
citizens’ lives, liberty and property, by force, in the 
hands of unreasonable and incompetent people.” (717)
– But excluding the unreasonable means putting their lives 
liberty and property by force in the hands of 
people/government over whom they have no say.  This 
seems to be intrinsically equivalent to the violation of the 
competence principle Brennan is concerned with.
– Both cases involve forcing people to obey certain rules that 
potentially undermine their L/L/P. In one case the decision-
making body is unreasonable, in the other, it excludes 
some who are impacted by its decisions.
(2)
• Brennan’s suggestions run the risk of increasing the 
average ability of the voting public, while decreasing 
the average ability of the citizenry at large
– People excluded from voting have less reason to care than 
people allowed to vote.
– People have more reason to care the more likely it is that 
their vote matters.
– By excluding many people through a rigorous competence 
standard, Brennan’s suggestion removes reasons to care 
from a large number of people.
– This has the effect of causing an ever-decreasing number 
of people to be competent, thereby rushing headlong into 
epistocracy.
• Further, Brennan’s suggestion removes from the public 
incentives to know more about Politics, and thereby to 
be competent in his terms.
• He proposes, in other words, to punish people for 
acting rationally by removing their voting rights.
• He conflates two issues: one, whether an individual is 
competent to vote, and two, whether an individual 
exercises their vote competently.
– It is possible for a competent voter to vote incompetently, 
for a variety of reasons. His proposal could not remove this 
competent voter from the rolls, yet their presence 
undermines his desired outcomes.
(3)
• Brennan is concerned that allowing ignorant, irrational 
or morally unreasonable persons to vote risks 
impinging on the life, liberty or property of the 
reasonable, rational citizens who are bound by the 
collective decision of the polity.
– But there is a symmetry here in that his proposed 
alternative compels the unreasonable to have their lives, 
liberty and property constrained by a government which, 
while it may not have been elected by any unreasonable 
agents, they had no part in the choosing of.
– So there is an objection, internal to the libertarian focus on 
L/L/P, to his position.
So…
• Brennan notes a problem in modern 
democracies.
• But his proposed alternative seems to share the 
problem, on his own terms.
• Further, his proposal runs afoul of all the things 
democrats avoid by being democratic.
• So, we shouldn’t do what Brennan wants 
(abandoning the inclusive presumption, 





• Most people think we ought not to 
enfranchise infants.
• Per the inclusive presumption, this holds only 
if enfranchising them would make our 
democracy worse.
– We could frame this as Brennan does: Does 
including infants expose others within the 
democracy to undue risk in the selection of policy 
or of rulers?
No.
A worst case scenario
• At worst, enfranchised infants would 
systematically vote badly, choosing the worst 
of the available options. 
• This is unlikely to occur. Most (all?) infants are 
incapable of making the reasoned decisions 
that would allow them to identify the worst 
available option.
Plausible Outcomes
• More plausibly, they would (mostly) fail to cast 
valid votes.
• Those who did successfully cast ballots would 
select randomly among the available options 
(as do some enfranchised adults).
• Neither of these possibilities provides good 
reason to disenfranchise them.
Potential Risks
• Worse outcomes
– Tips balance from Party A to Party B in a given 
election
– Causes parties to (negatively) alter policies to 





• If infants are incompetent, this won’t occur. 
Their votes will distribute evenly across all 
options.
• If infants are competent, their votes may 
cluster.
– But we don’t care when the votes of other voters 
cluster in similar ways.
– We cannot, while being consistent, care if they do 
so here.
(2)
• Even if all children vote ‘wrongly’ it won’t hurt the 
outcomes (Goodin & List, 2001; Goodin & Lau, 2011), 
but it will help the voters in question learn how to vote 
properly. (Cook, 2013)
• “Voting provides opportunities to develop 
democratically through direct experience of 
democracy; in a context where the law of large 
numbers provides safety from responsibility for 
Outcomes; and where the decisions of the majority 
provide a prompt for reflection and revision of 
children’s democratic choices.” (Cook, 2013)
Altered Policy
• Younger voters can be seduced to vote for particular 
parties by ridiculous policies: Free candy, fewer school 
hours…
– But these same policies will alienate other voters and play 
badly in the media.
• Further, that a policy is ridiculous doesn’t seem to 
matter in other contexts: Trump is free to promise to 
make Mexico pay for the building of a giant wall…
– We might not like a polity that responds favourably to such 
promises. But our response should be to make the polity 
better, not cut them off from political activity.
Vote Dilution
• Not a problem of itself.
– All inclusions of more voters dilute the voting 
power of the incumbent voter group.
• We have both rightsy & utility arguments for 
diluting the vote in this way (avoid rights 
breaches via disenfranchisement / lower risks 
of random votes)
Rights Breaches
• Asymmetrical nature of voting rights – over-
exclusion breaches the right to vote of the 
excluded, over-inclusion causes no such 
breaches.
• (Brennan argues that there are L/L/P rights 
breaches but his claims don’t seem to hold up 
to scrutiny)
Undermining Democratic Values
• Perhaps letting infants vote will undermine 
public belief in the efficacy of democratic 
procedures.
• But this is the same fearmongering nonsense 
advanced as a reason not to let *any other 
previously excluded group* participate.
– We rejected this before, we should do so again.
• If the public hates/fears/scorns/rejects the 
inclusion of x, tell them to suck it up.
So, why enfranchise infants?
• Unlike in the case of disenfranchised children, I 
doubt any infants are capable.
• By enfranchising everyone (including infants) you 
avoid the rights breaches arising from under-
inclusion of capable citizens.
• We ensure that every citizen can vote when they 
desire to. More opportunities to vote = more 
chances to learn how to vote well.
• While no infants are at risk of false exclusion, 
some young children are. Enfranchising them 
early avoids this.
• Expansive inclusion also minimises the impact that 
incapable voters have on electoral outcomes.
• Given the capacity standards commonly accepted, 
those *incapable* of voting will, if they successfully 
cast a ballot, cast it randomly.
• If we have random votes in the system, we should want 
as many of them as possible.
– This increases the likelihood of a statistically normal 
distribution.
– So, there is less chance the random votes will favour any 
position.
• They cancel each other out
– Enfranchising infants provides a source of random votes to 
counterbalance those of the currently included 
incompetent.
• If people are not incapable of voting, but instead 
merely vote in ways we consider sub-optimal, this 
provides no reason to disenfranchise them.
• We are not entitled (see inclusive presumption) 
to exclude people merely because of how we fear 
they will vote. This applies as much to infants as 
to anyone else.
• We should, however, try to ensure that people 
make well-reasoned decisions in how they vote.
– This can be achieved not through 
(dis)enfranchisement, but through voter education.
Extant Democracies
• States already have duties to facilitate voting by a 





• The inclusion of younger voters, including infants, 
provides an incentive that is currently lacking for 
states to engage in voter education efforts.
Conclusions
• The inclusive presumption tells us we should let 
people vote unless their doing so will undermine 
our democratic institutions/values.
• Enfranchising all young people including infants 
will not undermine our democratic 
institutions/values.
• Enfranchising all young people will encourage 
states to engage in various positive voter 
education programs.
• We should enfranchise younger people, down to 
and including infants.
